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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE WARRANTLESS SEIZURE AND SEARCH OF MEHEW'S 
VEHICLE WAS NOT JUSTIFIED UNDER THE AUTOMOBILE 
EXCEPTION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ARTICLE I, 
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION ARE CONGRUENT IN 
THIS RESULT 
The State cites a string of cases from the United States Supreme Court to support 
its position that when an automobile is involved, no matter what the circumstances, a 
search warrant is never required to search the automobile as long as probable cause 
exists and there is a mere possibility that the car will be moved. Federal and State case 
law does not support the state's position in this case. 
The United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have applied the 
automobile exception to the search warrant doctrine in situations where there was 
justification for a police stop. Moreover, both courts have applied the automobile 
exception almost exclusively in cases where the police stopped the vehicle for a traffic 
violation and then obtained probable cause to search, or where the police observed a 
vehicle being used in the process of drug transactions. In both situations, the vehicles 
were "readily mobile," because people were driving the vehicle at the time of the stop 
or the defendant just got out of the vehicle and probable cause existed for criminal 
behavior. In all situations, the fact that the vehicles were "readily mobile" justified the 
officers' search without a warrant because there was not time to obtain a search 
warrant; or rather the fact that the vehicle was readily mobile was the exigency itself. 
In Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280 (1925), government 
agents observed the defendants transporting alcohol in their car and stopped and 
searched the car without a warrant. Id. at 160-61. The United States Supreme Court 
reasoned that an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement to obtain a search 
warrant was justified because "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the 
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant 
must be sought." Id. at 153. 
In California v. Carney, All U.S. 386, 105 S.Ct. 2066 (1985), officers viewed 
young boys enter and leave the defendant's vehicle, then stopped and questioned one of 
the individuals, and were told that the defendant was exchanging sexual favors for 
marijuana. Id. at 388. The officers then searched the vehicle without a warrant. Id. 
The Court found that defendant's motor home fit within the automobile exception 
because of its capacity to be "quickly moved." Id. at 392-93. The Court noted that 
reduced expectation of privacy was also a factor to consider under the automobile 
exception, and emphasized that "the capacity to be 'quickly moved' was clearly the 
basis of the holding in Carroll, and our cases have consistently recognized ready 
mobility as one of the principal bases of the automobile exception." Id. at 390; See, 
e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 59, 87 S.Ct. 788, 789 (1967); Chambers v. 
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1981 (1970); Cady v. Dombrowske, 413 
U.S. 433, 442, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973); Cardwell v. Lewis, All U.S. 583, 588, 94 
2 
S.Ct. 2464, 2468 (1974); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367, 96 S.Ct. 
3092, 3096 (1976). 
In Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 119 S.Ct. 2013 (1999) (per curiam), 
police received information from a confidential informant that the defendant, a known 
drug dealer, would be driving a red Toyota, license number DDY 787, with a 
substantial amount of cocaine. Id. The police investigated the tip and corroborated the 
information, then stopped and searched the vehicle and found drugs in the defendant's 
vehicle. Id. at 466. The Court found sufficient probable cause for the stop and search, 
and that a warrant was not necessary under the automobile exception because the car 
was readily mobile. Id. at 467. In doing so, the Court relied on Pennsylvania v. 
Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 116 S.Ct. 2485 (1996) (per curiam). 
In Labron, the Supreme Court, in another per curiam decision, resolved two 
cases under the automobile exception doctrine. In the first case, police observed 
Labron and others engaging in a series of drug transactions from a vehicle, then 
arrested the suspects and searched the vehicle from which the drugs had been produced 
and found bags containing cocaine. 518 U.S. at 939. The second case involved police 
observing an undercover informant agreeing to buy drugs from Kilgore in a parking lot, 
then driving back to the defendant's farmhouse where the undercover informant 
obtained the drugs. Id. After the drugs were delivered, the police searched the 
farmhouse with the consent of the owner and also searched Kilgore's truck, which was 
parked in the driveway of the farmhouse. Id. During the drug transaction, the police 
observed the defendants "walking to and from the truck." Id. 
The United States Supreme Court upheld both of these searches under the 
automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. The Court in 
Labron found that this exception was "based on the automobile's 'ready mobility,' an 
exigency sufficient to excuse failure to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to 
conduct the search is clear." Id. at 940 (see Carney, All U.S. at 390-91). 
In State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996), officers pulled over the 
defendant, known for carrying weapons, after receiving reports of drug trafficking, and 
searched his vehicle for drugs and other contraband without a warrant. Id. at 1230-31. 
The Utah Supreme Court cited Carroll and California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S 565, 111 
S.Ct. 1982, (1991) (probable cause and exigent circumstances required as a 
precondition to a valid warrantless search of an automobile), and found that the 
automobile exception applied. Anderson, 910 P.2d at 1236-37'. 
In cases where the United States Supreme Court and Utah Courts have applied 
the automobile exception due to the mobility of the vehicle, the officers did not have 
time to obtain a search warrant because the officers either made a justified stop of the 
vehicle or observed suspicious transactions related to the vehicle without sufficient time 
to obtain a search warrant after obtaining probable cause. Thus, it is apparent that 
although the Supreme Court states, "if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists 
to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment... permits police to search the 
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vehicle without more" Dyson, 527 U.S. at 467, the Court has not held that a search of 
an automobile without a warrant is justified under any circumstance as long as there is 
probable cause to support the search and the vehicle is readily mobile. And in Labron, 
the Court made clear that a vehicle's ready mobility was in fact the exigency that 
allowed a search without a warrant. See Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. 
The present case is unlike any case the United States Supreme Court or Utah 
Courts have applied the automobile exception to. In Carroll, Dyson, Labron, and 
Anderson, where officers justifiably "stopped" each of the defendants in their vehicles 
and conducted a search without a warrant, the Court's justified each search on the 
reason that the officer would not have time to obtain before a search warrant before 
possible evidence could be destroyed due to the mobility of the vehicles. And in 
Carney and the second case the United States Supreme Court considered in Labron, the 
officers were justified in searching the vehicles because they personally observed 
criminal activity related to the vehicles and did not have time to obtain a search warrant 
before possible evidence could be destroyed due to the mobility of the vehicles. 
In the present case, Mehew was not "stopped" in her vehicle due to a traffic 
violation or other suspicious behavior related to her vehicle. In fact, the vehicle was 
parked in the driveway of her residence in the middle of the night and Mehew had 
already been interrogated and arrested (R. 142: 28-29). Instead, Officer Bean was 
notified by the Orem police that Mehew's vehicle was at the residence (R. 143: 10-11). 
With this information, there was sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant 
from a neutral magistrate without alerting Mehew or anyone else of the investigation. 
Instead, Officer Bean went to Mehew's residence in the middle of the night, woke 
Mehew, questioned her and eventually arrested her (R. 143: 11-15). 
Before this point in time, there was no threat or danger that any evidence of an 
alleged crime would be destroyed. The alleged criminal activity involved was not 
easily disposable drugs; it was an installed stereo system in a previously identified 
vehicle. There was absolutely no danger that evidence would be lost before obtaining a 
search warrant. If any danger ever arose that evidence might be destroyed, it was due 
to the officer's actions of waking Mehew's family after midnight. Thus, the officer 
created the exigency if one existed at all. 
And as seen above, although the United States Supreme Court as of late has 
stated that probable cause and a mobile automobile is sufficient to justify a warrantless 
search of an automobile, the circumstances surrounding the stop of the automobile and 
the mobility of the automobile is the exigency that allows for the warrantless search. 
See Labron, 518 U.S. at 940. 
Therefore, this case is readily distinguishable from the cases cited by the State 
that the United States Supreme Court and Utah Courts have applied the automobile 
exception to. There was no danger of evidence being destroyed or crossing jurisdiction 
lines, and if any exigency existed, it was caused by the officers' actions. For the stated 
reasons above, Mehew relies on her prior brief to support her claim of the police 
manufactured exigency. 
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This issue is not insignificant. Under the State's view, any automobile, any 
time, anywhere is subject to an intrusive search as long as probable cause exists that 
contraband will be found therein, and as long as the automobile is capable of being 
moved. Mehew asserts that this reasoning is unacceptable on constitutional grounds. 
The State's argument supports the view that police officers have the outright authority 
to search any automobile, regardless of other important circumstances, without a search 
warrant so long as the officer believes probable cause exists that contraband will be 
found in the automobile and that it is possible that the automobile can be moved. Such 
a standard gives unfettered discretion to officers to search any vehicle whenever they 
want. Of course the probable cause determination is reviewable by courts, but this 
provides little protection to the untold numbers of people that will have their 
constitutional rights violated by over-zealous officers. 
Neither the Fourth Amendment nor Article I section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
affords the government such a sweeping grant of authority. The search and seizure in 
the present case was not justified and this Court should correct the trial court's legal 
conclusion that the warrantless search and seizure of Mehew's was justifiable. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons and the reasons stated in the original brief, Mehew 
asks this Court to reverse the trial court's denial of her motions to suppress. Mehew 
further asks that this matter be remanded to the Fourth District Court with instruction 
that her pleas are to be withdrawn, that all the evidence obtained as a result of the 
warrantless search and seizure is to be suppressed, and that this matter is to be 
dismissed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this j 5 _ day of March, 2003. 
Margaret P/ Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant 
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